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Non-technical summary
Since Krugman has assumed increasing core-periphery tendencies due to stronger sectoral
concentration and regional specialisation in an economically integrated Europe, controversial
discussions about this prediction have risen. However, the seminal study of Krugman comparing EU
and US regional specialisation levels bases on mobile labour. But this high mobility of employees
across US states contrasts sharply with the low mobility of labour across the EU. Results on
specialisation tendencies for US states which base on employment data can therefore not simply be
extended to EU countries or regions. Neglecting capital, though, might lead to disturbed results –
especially inside the EU where we face an increasing mobility of capital which is enforced by the
EMU and financial market integration. This study therefore aims at identifying the economic
determinants of the (un)even relative regional allocation of capital across industries (i.e. of regional
investment specialisation levels). Its focus is on regional patterns as a profound analysis of regional,
not only national, specialisation is still missing in recent research.
We consider regional data of the Eurostat REGIO database for the period between 1985 and 1994. Our
focus is on NUTS 1- as well as on NUTS 2-regions – the latter being further disaggregated than the
former. 56 NUTS 2- and 33-NUTS 1-regions from seven EU countries are included: France, Italy,
Belgium, UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Luxembourg. The three latter, however, are mono-regional
countries at NUTS 1- and NUTS 2-level, i.e. they are not disaggregated any further.
In order to capture the degree to which EU regions differ in their investment structures, indices of
relative specialisation in terms of gross fixed capital formation are calculated for each region and each
year. These relative investment specialisation indices are calculated with, first, the respective country
and, second, EU chosen to be the reference economy. This means that sectoral investment shares are
analysed in relation to the average national and to EU sectoral shares. Both perspectives lead to
slightly different specialisation patterns, but the economic impacts identified in the econometric
analyses are similar.
One important, but unsurprising feature that can be detected is the higher level of relative investment
specialisation when regarding the more disaggregated NUTS 2-regions in comparison to the NUTS 1-
regions. In a descriptive analysis of the most and the least specialised regions within each country, we
find higher specialised regions to perform worse in economic terms than lower specialised regions
with respect to unemployment rate, number of patents, total regional GDP and total regional GFCF.
The fact that the distribution of relative investment shares is more uneven in peripheral regions than in
core regions while these regions are of poorer economic performance, already stresses the importance
for the EU and its member countries not to neglect their focus on economic development of peripheral
regions. Economic centres, especially the region of Bruxelles and the Île de France, are highly
specialised as well. However, they demonstrate a large potential of high economic performance. As no
causal relationship can be derived from this purely descriptive analysis, econometric analyses are
conducted to test for the significance of potential determinants of the even or uneven relative
allocation of investments across sectors within a region.
The theoretical basis for the empirical investigation of the determinants of sectoral concentration and
regional specialisation of economic activity is vast. According to traditional trade theories, regional
specialisation takes place in accordance with comparative advantages. The regional economics’
polarisation theory stresses the potential cumulative causation of factor agglomeration in the centre
and backwash effects for peripheral regions. Gravity models focus on centripetal forces such as market
size and centrifugal forces such as transport costs and imperfect economic integration or liberalisation.
Finally, the New Economic Geography finds transaction costs and economies of scale to explain
among others the concentration of sectors in space. The core thus specialises in sectors with high
economies of scale, the periphery in sectors with low or constant economies of scale.
We conduct GLS-estimates accounting for potential heteroscedasticity, instrumental-variable estimates
accounting for possible endogeneity between specialisation and some of its determinants as well as a
dynamic specification capturing possible first-order serial correlation effects. In addition, a logistic
transformation was used to take account of the endogenous variable’s restriction to the range between
zero and one. All estimations lead to very similar results and provide evidence of a high importance of
regional size, market size, the unemployment rate as well as the location in the centre or the periphery,
population density, economic openness as well as capital market integration.
The bigger the size of a region is, the higher is the similarity of relative investments. Market size
reflects the economic and demand potential of a region: The higher it is, the lower the relative
specialisation in terms of investments tends to be. This is in contrast to the results of recent empirical
studies on sectoral agglomeration which found market size to have an increasing influence on sectoral
concentration across space. While firms tend to locate close to large markets and high demand (thus
increasing sectoral concentration), regions with a large market seem to attract capital of all types of
sectors with a rather even relative allocation (thus decreasing relative regional dissimilarities). This
effect is counteracted by an apparently strong tendency towards high specialisation of central,
economically most important regions who demonstrate to have a significantly higher level of relative
investment specialisation. Equally, population density increases the specialisation level. The
unemployment rate, finally, reflects negative economic performance of a region (not accounting for
migration effects etc.). The higher it is, the stronger the relative regional specialisation turns out to be.
The higher the distance of a region to the economic centre is, the less similar are its investment shares
to EU average. Peripheral regions are thus stronger specialised in terms of relative investments than
regions closer to the centre.
In addition, the impacts of economic openness and the influence of capital market integration are
tested in separate estimates. Both indicators, however, are not available at the regional level, but only
at the country level. They therefore might pick up country-specific effects in cross-sectional analyses.
However, reliable results on the impact of liberalisation tendencies are gained in the pooled
regressions when we are able to exploit the indicators’ variation over time while efficiently controlling
for country-specific effects. Both, the extent of capital market integration as well as economic
openness consistently seem to have a significant increasing impact on relative specialisation levels of
gross fixed capital formation.
Comparing results for NUTS 2- and the more aggregated NUTS 1-level, we find them to be similar.
Only the regional size does not show a consistent significant influence on relative investment
specialisation in NUTS 1-regions. As NUTS 1-regions are higher aggregated and usually consist of a
number of NUTS 2-regions, their size differs much less than at NUTS 2-level. In addition, bigger
regions are logically more diversified in relative investments than smaller regions. Thus, this result is
not surprising.
By means of fixed effects estimates, there are only few significant impacts to be detected. The region-
specific constants all turn out to be highly significant in the fixed effects estimates. Consistently, we
find only low explanatory power of further exogenous variables when controlling for region-specific
effects. Regional characteristics like regional gross domestic product, the regional unemployment rate,
regional size, the distance to the economic centre as well as the fact of being a central region thus
seem to determine the respective level of specialisation to a large extent. The variation over time,
though, is not explained by our regressions. In addition, the extent of market integration and thus of
European integration seems to strengthen relative specialisation tendencies.
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Abstract
This paper analyses the level of relative specialisation in terms of gross fixed capital
formation in EU regions for the period between 1985 and 1994. Controlling for
heteroscedasticity and potential endogeneity problems, we get consistent econometric results.
Larger market and regional sizes diminish relative investment specialisation while a higher
unemployment rate, population density, the fact of being a central region, the distance to the
economic centre, and economic liberalisation increase its level. The variation of the
specialisation level of one region over time, however, cannot be explained econometrically, it
thus might underlie random disturbances.
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1I Introduction
Since Krugman (1991) has assumed increasing core-periphery tendencies due to stronger
sectoral concentration and regional specialisation in an economically integrated Europe,
controversial discussions about this prediction have risen. On the one hand, regional
specialisation leads to a number of advantages. Firms or whole industries are able to benefit
from economies of scale and intra-industrial linkages to a higher extent. On the other hand,
the strong regional specialisation increases the potential risk of asymmetric shocks.
Specialisation tendencies thus lead to the need of improved or new shock absorbing
mechanisms on the national and even regional level, whereas inside EMU, monetary policy is
centralised at the European level.
The seminal study of Krugman which confronts a lower level of relative specialisation in the
EU with a higher one in the US is based on the analysis of mobile labour. But the high
mobility of employees across US states contrasts sharply with that across the EU. Results on
specialisation tendencies for US states which rely on employment data can therefore not
simply be extended to EU countries or regions. In addition, inside the EU, an increasing
mobility of capital enforced by European Monetary Union (EMU) and increased financial
market integration can be observed. Due to the possible substitution of capital and labour as
factors of production, the allocation of capital might reflect specialisation tendencies inside
the EU which cannot be detected when restricting investigations to labour. However, up to
now theoretical and descriptive analyses on regional specialisation and sectoral concentration
focus on the production factor labour and are only rarely extended to production or trade data.
The allocation of capital (investments and/or direct investments), however, has been neglected
so far, but is subject of the analysis in Stirboeck (2001) and in European Commission (1999).
In addition, a profound analysis of regional, not national, patterns of concentration or
specialisation is still neglected in recent research. Exceptions are the studies of Kalemli-
Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (1999), Tirado, Paluzie and Pons (2000) as well as Stirboeck
(2001).
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent of regional specialisation inside the EU
with the emphasis on the identification of important determinants of relative investment
dissimilarities in EU regions and the impact of EU-integration on these regional
developments. Determinants of regional specialisation and sectoral agglomeration tendencies
are given by theoretical models of the international trade theory, regional economics as well
as the new economic geography. In section II, these are summarised very shortly and the
results of recent econometric analyses on the allocation of production and their empirical
determinants are given.
Our econometric investigations on the determinants of the similar or dissimilar relative
allocation of sectoral gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) within regions are then presented
in section III. Data refer to the period 1985 to 1994 and to two different aggregation levels of
the Eurostat nomenclature of territorial units (NUTS – Nomenclature des unités territoriales)
of seven EU countries: NUTS 1- and NUTS 2-regions. NUTS 2-regions, the less aggregated
geographical entities, are of particular importance as EU regional policy is implemented at
NUTS 2-level. We run, for the 10 separate years, cross-sectional as well as pooled regressions
by use of GLS- and IV-estimates as well as pooled regressions in logit terms. In addition,
fixed effects (within) estimates and between estimates are conducted to control for different
effects in the process of potentially dissimilar regional specialisation of EU regions. In these
econometric analyses, we can detect that a higher market size as well as the size of a region
decrease the regional level of relative investment specialisation while a higher rate of
2unemployment, number of patents as well as population density, the fact of being a central
region, and the distance to the economic centre increase it. A higher level of economic
openness or of capital market integration also leads to stronger structural dissimilarity.
II Explaining sectoral concentration and regional specialisation tendencies
In traditional trade theory, regional specialisation is assumed to be in accordance with
comparative advantages. Agglomeration tendencies such as a high density of population,
capital or economic activity in only one regional area and a disequilibrium in economic
developments are not to be expected. In a world with perfect capital mobility, investments
should flow into those regions which are marked by low capital intensity in production, i.e. a
relative abundance of labour, and thus the highest capital yields. Analogously, in case of
perfect labour mobility, employees should migrate to the place where the highest wages can
be gained. This process continues until an (international) equilibrium with identical factor
prices is reached.
Gravity models in international economics explain economic flows between regions through
gravitational and resistance forces such as market size or market potential, distance, barriers
to international activity etc. The seminal gravity models of e.g. Tinbergen (1962) and
Linnemann (1966) aimed at the determination of bilateral international trade flows. Due to
their high power in the empirical explanation of bilateral flows, gravity models were extended
to the analysis of e.g. direct investment flows, migration or tourism. The spatial concentration
of e.g. investments can thus be the result of gravitational forces. These forces will gain
importance when resistance forces, such as transport costs or imperfect integration, go down.
The new economic geography has sharply increased the importance of regional economic
theory in the 1990s. It has induced a new wave of attention to concentration and specialisation
patterns. However, regional economics have already provided a number of approaches to
explain regional development patterns before the 1990s. The polarisation theory with such
concepts as those of Myrdal (1957) and Hirschman (1958) have a great importance in this
context. Myrdal (1957) stresses possible circular and cumulative agglomeration tendencies
due to a “backwash-effect” which is unfortunate for peripheral regions. As qualified labour is
marked by a higher mobility, they will move faster to exploit the core region’s incentives and
higher wages1. The approach of Hirschman (1958) bases on forward and backward linkages,
i.e. advantages resulting from being close to the markets of procurement and to consumers.
Again, these linkages lead to cumulative agglomeration in those regions already profiting
from large markets. However, Hirschman assumes that in case of too large agglomeration,
negative impacts prevent a further increase.
The new economic geography has gained a special focus of attention as according to these
models, specialisation need not – like in the neo-classical world – to develop according to the
comparative advantage of regions, but can be the result of historical conditions and
macroeconomic (partly random) processes. Thus even similar regions can develop differently
and the resulting patterns of specialisation are ex ante unpredictable. The new economic
geography relies on some contributions of the new international trade theory giving up a
number of assumptions which were prevalent in the neo-classical theory: existence of
homogeneous products, identical production functions, perfect competition, and constant
                                                
1 The existence of “spread effects”, however, provides some positive spill-over effects for the peripheral regions.
But Myrdal (1957) assumes them to be of minor importance.
3economies of scale. The incomplete equalisation of factor prices and spatial agglomerations
can now be explained. Monopolistic competition is modelled by the use of specific consumer
preferences: the preference for differentiated products (i.e. a “love of variety”)2. Due to the
existence of economies of scale at the level of plants (further increased by economies of
localisation at the industrial level), firms do not produce at each single place of local demand.
Instead, the production of each differentiated good is locally concentrated and close to large
markets. The core thus specialises in economic activity underlying increasing economies of
scale, the periphery in agriculture or industries with constant or low economies of scale.
In his core-periphery model, Krugman (1991, 1995, 1996) considers one single production
factor – labour – due to reasons of simplicity. He differentiates between mobile labour in the
industrial sector and immobile labour in agriculture; hence according to Krugman (1991)
agglomeration is measured by the concentration of labour force. In case of high transport
costs, the allocation of production over space is rather persistent. Transport costs are a
centrifugal force working against the spatial concentration of production. Decreasing transport
costs, though, strengthen the centripetal force of economies of scale and might thus be a
trigger for the concentration of production. This leads to a rise in labour demand and wages,
and mobile labour will migrate to this region. This is the stronger the lower transport costs are
which are finally reflected in higher real wages through lower prices. If transport costs are
low enough, industrial workers might even concentrate in one region.
Some extensions and improvements of this seminal new economic geography model have
been conducted in the last years – a survey of these developments can be found in Krugman
(1998). An important extension to the standard model giving up the assumption of perfect
labour mobility and hereby adapting better to intra-EU conditions is developed by Venables
(1996) as well as Krugman and Venables (1995). In their theoretical framework, the
concentration of production in the core can decrease again as soon as transport costs reach a
critical low level. The reason for this is the dispersing influence of low wages in the periphery
which is strong enough when transport costs are sufficiently low. Production in the periphery
will then be expanded as immobile labour does not migrate to the core regions although these
are marked by higher wages. This theoretical approach therefore predicts an inverse U-shaped
development of concentration.
In addition to the imperfect labour mobility, another very important problem persists in the
context of European integration. Not only is labour rather immobile across European borders
and can even be assumed to be less mobile within EU countries than across US-states, also
capital movements have become increasingly liberalised throughout the process of European
monetary and economic integration3. However, spatial developments are explained by
theoretical models that focus on labour and the effects of labour mobility. Krugman himself
proposed to focus on mobile capital in future research in the framework of the new economic
                                                
2 This kind of consumer preference has first been introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
3 All restrictions on long- and even short-term capital movements within EU are formally prohibited since the
passing of the EU-Council directive 88/361/EEC in June 1988. However, a large number of exceptions to this
directive have existed for very long. Even according to the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions 2000,
some of them were still persisting in 1999 – the year of the instauration of EMU. In addition to these national
administrative barriers, the segmentation of European capital markets also impeded the perfect liberalisation of
capital movements. However, the European Common Market as well as the preparation and installation of EMU
have exerted a great pressure on the implementation of perfect and unhindered capital mobility and have already
improved market integration. For details, see e.g. the recent studies of Santillán, Bayle and Thygesen (2000),
European Commission (2000) as well as Danthine, Giavazzi and von Thaden (2000).
4geography (Krugman and Venables, 1995)4. The empirical analyses of this paper are one step
forward in this direction.
In spite of the growing number of theoretical and empirical studies on the location of
industries, econometric studies explaining the extent of sectoral concentration and regional
specialisation are still rare. Recent econometric studies investigating concentration tendencies
of production across EU countries are Amiti (1999) and Haaland et al. (1999) as well as
Tirado, Paluzie and Pons (2000) focusing on industrial shares in Spanish regions in the 19th
century. The level of the industrial specialisation of regions of – among others – three EU
countries, finally, is focussed on by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (1999).
Amiti (1999) gets evidence for significant, positive effects of economies of scale and
intermediate good intensities on the concentration of industries across five European countries
in addition to mostly significant positive fixed industry and time effects which are not
explained by the model. Fixed time effects have been increasing over time which according to
the author might pick up trade liberalisation effects. In Haaland et al. (1999), the most
important determinant for the relative sectoral concentration turns out to be market size, i.e.
industries tend to locate close to larger markets. A smaller, but significant effect is also found
for labour intensity, i.e. skill-intensive industries seem to concentrate in countries offering
highly skilled labour. By use of spatial econometrics5, Tirado, Paluzie and Pons (2000)
empirically confirm that the industrial intensity (i.e. the share of industrial production in total
production) of Spanish provinces strongly increased in the 19th century. It was influenced
negatively by the province’s share of population, and positively by human capital endowment,
relative size of the province’s market, and the extent of large scale production (approximated
by the province’s average tax payment by taxpayer). As the authors compare two points in
time before and after the Spanish market integration, they conclude that market integration
can be regarded as a trigger of the sharply increased agglomeration of economic activities.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (1999) find higher population density, lower per capita
gross domestic product, lower population as well as a higher degree of risk sharing (supposed
to represent financial market integration or development) to have a significant increasing
impact on the industrial specialisation of regions.
The presented theoretical frameworks point to a number of centripetal forces such as market
potential, economies of scale or local demand which seem to be important determinants in the
explanation of sectoral concentration tendencies. Transport or transaction costs play an
essential role as a centrifugal force according to the theory as well. In case of mobile capital,
transaction costs are largely determined by capital market integration and liberalisation. Both,
transaction costs and integration variables will capture effects of EU-integration on regional
development. The econometric investigations of concentration tendencies in production
mostly find some support for the traditional trade theory as well as the new economic
geography approaches. Several important exogenous variables are evident. The concentration
of industries across space appears to be determined by market size, human capital or labour
                                                
4 Amiti (2001) is a first model that explicitly includes capital as a second factor of production in addition to
labour. In this approach, however, both production factors are assumed to be immobile across borders. The
triggers for agglomeration are increasing returns to scale as well as vertical linkages which can enforce the
agglomeration of intermediate input supplier (upstream) firms and manufactures of final goods (downstream
firms) in one region. In case of decreasing trade costs, the agglomeration of these vertically linked firms is
enforced. In the context of European integration, further extensions introducing mobile capital will, however, be
needed.
5 Spatial econometrics account for spatial interdependencies in the analysis of regions e.g. by use of a regional
weight matrix in GLS or ML estimations. For further details see Anselin (1988, 2001).
5intensity, scale intensities, and intermediate goods intensities (or market linkages). In
addition, integration seems to have an increasing effect on sectoral concentration.
In this study, however, we focus on regional developments and the similarity of sectoral
structures of EU regions. Hereby, we investigate the allocation of different industrial sectors
within a region and hence, to what extent a country or region is specialised sectorally. By this,
we do not explain why a region is especially strong or specialised in a particular sector (what
is in the focus of traditional trade theory). Instead, our attention is on the determinants of an
uneven allocation of capital within a region, i.e. the level of relative specialisation. As long as
regional specialisation arises along with sectoral concentration, its level might equally be
influenced by market size or the gravitational force of the centre. In addition, the distance to
the centre and integration or liberalisation impacts (extending potential markets and enforcing
gravitational forces) seem to be relevant determinants. Finally, a very important aspect to
focus on when analysing regional investments is the potential of economic growth within a
region, e.g. number of patents and the regional economic situation.
III  Empirical evidence: What determines the similarity of relative
investments in EU regions?
As a measure of investment specialisation, Gini-coefficients are constructed as in the studies
of Krugman (1991), Brülhart (1998), Klüver and Rübel (1998), and Amiti (1999)6. In order to
abstract from size and classification effects (i.e. the differing importance of sectors and the
possibly inadequate disaggregation of economic activity in subsectors), we do not calculate
the Gini-coefficient over absolute investment shares, but over relative ones, i.e. investment
shares in relation to an economy of reference7. This is important as the absolute allocation of
production across sectors does not tell anything about a particularly high level of sectoral
engagement of that region while this is what we focus on: relative allocation and hence,
relative specialisation. It is the unequal size of regions or sectors that generally causes the
difference between the absolute and the relative specialisation index8. Relative investment
                                                
6 However, Sapir (1996) analysing absolute country specialisation with export data made use of the Herfindahl
index instead, Greenaway and Hine (1991) of the Grubel-Lloyd, the Michaely as well as the Finger-Kreinin
index. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (1999) used a variance-like measure given their focus on risk-
sharing. For a discussion of these measure and their more detailed presentation see Stirboeck (2001).
7 The Gini-coefficient is well known from the analysis of problems of distribution and is expressed as the ratio of
twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45°-line. The Lorenz curve is constructed by plotting the - in
ascending order - cumulated relative sectoral shares. The Gini-coefficient can be used to focus either on relative
or absolute specialisation depending on the precise construction of industrial shares whose distribution is
analysed (see below). It gives strong weight to the middle parts of the distribution of relative sectoral shares. As
a consequence, changes in industrial sectors similar to the median structure have a larger effect on the value of
the Gini-coefficient than changes in industrial sectors at the outer sides of the distribution (Cowell, 1995).
However, the coefficient’s range between 0 (low concentration) and 1 (high concentration) usually reflects well
differences in the level of concentration. Therefore, the Gini-coefficient is the most widely used inequality
measure in the analysis of the spatial allocation of sectors or sectoral allocation of regional economic activity.
In addition to the calculation of the Gini-coefficient as a measure of relative regional specialisation, we also
calculated the Finger-Kreinin-index as well as the coefficient of variation of the relative sectoral shares. The
latter stresses changes at the outer sides of the distribution of relative sectoral shares which is in contrast to the
weighting of the Gini-coefficient. A graphical comparison of all three indicators shows a similar development
over time, the main difference is a generally lower value of the coefficient of variation which, however, does not
influence its course. We therefore do not expect sharply differing results when using these alternative measures.
8 While measures of absolute allocation are influenced by regional size and sectoral classification, measures of
relative allocation are influenced by the sectoral patterns of either the economy of reference or the average
pattern of the group of countries included. In case of a very special pattern of the reference economy, the relative
specialisation pattern of the economic entities analysed can be biased. Further details on the construction of
6indices have therefore been constructed measuring the sectoral investment share of the
respective region in relation to the average investment share of the sector in the reference
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It thus captures the degree of homogeneity of these relative investment patterns of the
respective region10. In case of very similar relative investment shares for the different sectors
(i.e. similar relations of the regional investment shares for all sectors to their respective
average share in the reference economy), we get a Gini-coefficient close to zero representing
a low level of relative investment specialisation. This Gini-coefficient ranges between 0 and
(N-1)/N. The standardised Gini-coefficient G*N/(N-1), referred to as the Lorenz-Münzner-
coefficient, is used in the estimates.
These relative specialisation indices are calculated with respect to two different perspectives.
First, the reference economy for each region is the respective country. Therefore, the
allocation of relative investment shares in relation to the average sectoral structure of the
respective country is calculated. Second, the EU is chosen to be the reference economy and
investment shares are analysed in relation to its sectoral patterns as a whole11. Both
perspectives lead to slightly different specialisation patterns which are discussed in the
following, but both are important. Inside the EU, economic policies and politics are still
dominated by nation-states. The focus of national economists and politicians is therefore often
restricted to national (economic) developments and potential economic imbalances across the
                                                                                                                                                        
different relative and absolute concentration and specialisation indices can be found in Stirboeck (2001) as well
as Krieger-Boden (1999).
9 Up to 17 differentiated sectors – consistent to the industrial classification of Nace Rev. 1 - Nomenclature des
activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes - are available in the REGIO database.
10 An alternative way of calculating the similarity of relative patterns by use of the Gini-coefficient was applied
by e.g. Krugman (1991) and Amiti (1999). According to their measure, the cumulative sums of sectoral shares of
the given regions are to be plotted against those of the reference economy ranked according to their relative
shares (i.e. the adapted Balassa-indices). Both sectoral structures (and not their relation) are thus directly
compared. In case of very equal sectoral structures, we also get a Gini-coefficient near zero. However, both
sectoral shares, the one of the respective region as well as the one of the reference economy, influence the value
of the Gini-coefficient. If a large sectoral share in e.g. the reference economy is confronted with an even larger
sectoral share in the region in focus, the value of the Gini-coefficient is largely determined by this economically
important sector. This effect influences the value of the level of relative specialisation for some regions.
Regression results for this kind of indicator, however, do only slightly change.
11 As the data on gross fixed capital formation is not in all cases as complete as we wish it to be, we had to use
other data which adequately captures national sectoral shares in the UK and Belgium. In addition, EU sectoral
gross fixed capital formation data is not available in the REGIO database either. Therefore, it was referred to
data of value added at basic prices in these cases. This is a good proxy for the economic importance of the
different sectors, and the same procedure is also adapted by Eurostat when regional or sectoral shares of
economic activity are needed.
7regions of one country. In contrast to this stands the overall European perspective which is
important when regarding regional developments or imbalances independent of national
borders or national investment structures. In addition, EU’s financial aid in the framework of
regional development programmes12 – with the exception of the Cohesion Funds – is accorded
only on the basis of regional characteristics, not national patterns.
III. 1    Descriptive features of the specialisation patterns of gross fixed capital
formation
The maximum number of regions included at the NUTS 2-level is 53 (56) for the national
perspective (European perspective) while it is 30 (33) at the NUTS 1-level13. These regions
belong to Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy as well as Great Britain
(only NUTS 1). Details are given in the appendix. For all other countries, the sectoral data
availability is not sufficient for our kind of analysis. The disaggregation of EU countries into
NUTS-regions is primarily based on political or administrative entities. Such “normative”
regions are regarded for practical reasons of data availability in the REGIO database but also
in accordance with the implementation of regional policies14. These regions are not grouped
together on the basis of economic criteria. This is often criticised by economists as this might
not give us the actual degree of specialisation of economic entities. However, the definition of
economic regions might differ for each variable or even sector regarded, i.e. a general
specification of regional disaggregation is inappropriate. In addition, the analysis of normative
regions disaggregated according to NUTS allows us to focus on the degree of specialisation of
a territorial community which is authorised to implement regional policies or is in the focus of
regional structural programmes. As the debate about how specialised EU’s regions are
originates in the question about their regional shock absorbing potential and the necessity of
improving regional policies, the analysis of administrative regional entities is one relevant
empirical aspect.
Table A4 presents average relative Gini-coefficients for all regions (measuring relative
specialisation of capital formation calculated in the national perspective – called GCCF in the
following) for the time period 1985 to 1994 as far as data has been available. Table A5 gives
the additional perspective of relative specialisation across EU regions with EU being the
economy of reference (called GCCFEU). One important feature that can be detected when
analysing French, Italian, and Belgian regions (the only countries with available investment
data for both NUTS 1- and NUTS 2-levels) is the higher level of specialisation when
regarding the more disaggregated NUTS 2-regions in comparison to the NUTS 1-regions.
Though this is not surprising as relative sectoral dissimilarities are very likely to be
aggregated away in bigger economic entities.
Unsurprising as well, is the fact that the level of relative specialisation in terms of the overall
European capital allocation is in general higher than the one in the national context15.
                                                
12 Objective 1-regions eligible to EU financial assistance in the framework of the Structural Funds are marked by
a gross domestic product per capita of less than 75 % of the average EU gross domestic product per capita.
13 As Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg are monoregional countries at the NUTS 1- as well as the NUTS 2-
level, their relative concentration can only be calculated in relation to EU average sectoral shares. Otherwise, the
specialisation indices would all be 1 per definition, and the concentration indices thus 0.
14 Since the 1961 Brussels Conference on Regional Economies, regional policies are generally applicated in
NUTS 2-regions (Eurostat, 1999).
15 To a minor extent, this difference is also due to the two different ways of calculating average national and EU
sectoral shares by gross fixed capital formation shares and value added shares. However, with the exception of
8Specialisation is slightly higher in Belgium, and strongly in French and Italian regions – the
difference is on average 0.134 in Italian, 0.104 in French, and 0.025 in Belgian regions. This
shows that the industrial structure of Belgium (which economically is a very open country) is
less differing from the average European structure than the one of France and Italy. However
in all countries, the regions’ rank with regard to the level of specialisation rarely changes16.
Some special cases are though obvious. The relative specialisation of the Île de France as well
as the one of Centre (F) sharply increases (when measured in relation to average EU shares)
what influences their rank. This, of course, is due to the fact that a large share of French
production is concentrated in these regions, thereby dominating the sectoral structure of
France but not the one of EU.
Further insights into the process of regional specialisation can be gained from a descriptive
comparison of the most “extreme” regions17. Table A6 and Table A7 focus on the two least
and the two most specialised NUTS 2-regions in relation to the national and the average EU
sectoral structure. Patterns are very similar for both, the GCCF- and the GCCFEU-variable.
With respect to GDP per capita, GFCF in percent of GDP, and net migration18, there are no
systematic differences between the regions analysed. But those regions with a more uniform
relative allocation of investments across industrial sectors are also marked by a higher number
of patents, higher absolute GFCF as well as consequently by higher absolute GDP. Higher
specialised regions, however, seem to perform worse in economic terms than lower
specialised regions with respect to the unemployment rate, the share of regional to total
employment, the number of patents, and total regional GDP as well as total regional GFCF.
Exceptions though are a number of regions which are – in economic terms – among the most
important and which usually are located in the centre of the respective countries19. As no
causal relationship can be derived from this purely descriptive analysis, econometric analyses
are conducted in the following to test for significance and importance of potential
determinants.
III. 2     Econometric evidence on the patterns of specialisation of gross fixed
capital formation
As presented above, a number of determinants from different theoretical approaches are
supposed to explain the level of regional specialisation of gross fixed capital formation.
However, explanatory variables added in this analysis are to some extent limited by the data
availability. Including the core variables mentioned above, we test the following specification:
GCCF(EU)i = β0 + β1MARi + β2AREAi + β3PATi + β4PODENi + β5UEWPi + β6CENTRi
+ β7INTi + β8ZENTRREGi
The market size (MAR) of region i is approximated by gross domestic product (GDP)20.
Additional important exogenous variables are the size of a region (AREA), the number of
                                                                                                                                                        
„other services“ and „recovery, repair, trade, lodging, and catering services“, the difference in sectoral shares is
of minor extent.
16 This, however, is rather different for the concentration patterns of UK and Belgian regions with respect to the
average EU and their average national sectoral structure. This might to a large extent be due to the low number
of sectors that we could include in the analysis of the British and Belgian regions.
17 A detailed description of these characteristics can be found in Stirboeck (2001) for the national perspective.
18 Here, only data since 1997 is available.
19 This effect becomes even more obvious when regarding Bruxelles and the Île de France at the NUTS 1-level.
20 Further variables reflecting market size are the regional level of gross fixed capital formation, value added at
factor costs, total population, total employment as well as (aggregated) compensation of employees.
9patents (PAT), population density (PODEN), unemployment rate in percent of working
population (UEWP) which are all taken from the REGIO database. The distance of the region
to the economic centre (CENTR) capturing effects of peripheral location21, variables
representing European integration (INT), i.e. economic openness and capital account
liberalisation indices, as well as an indicator variable for central, economically most important
regions (ZENTRREG) are added. Details on all these variables are given in the data appendix.
Unfortunately, data on patent applications has not been available for Corse and Northern
Ireland. As a consequence, these two regions are dropped in the estimations when using
patents as explanatory variables. In addition, data on patents are only available since 1989.
Separate estimations for the shorter time period are therefore presented when patents turn out
to be an important variable in panel estimates.
The inclusion of the presented potential explanatory variables in the final estimation models
of the cross-sectional analysis has been determined by the result of a likelihood ratio (LR) test
at the 10%-level of significance22. The decision between two different (non-nested) models
for the same period has been made in accordance with the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
We estimated variance-corrected standard errors by generalised least squares (GLS) to
prevent that potential heteroscedasticity influences the coefficients’ significance.
However, we cannot exclude from pure theory a potential problem of reverse causation
between the level of investment specialisation and regional gross domestic product or the
regional rate of unemployment. In order to control for potential endogeneity problems,
instrumental variable regressions have been conducted additionally for both GCCF and
GCCFEU. Following one common approach in econometric analysis, lagged values of the
unemployment rate as well as of gross domestic product are included as instruments. As a
consequence, results are very similar, and most coefficients are even nearly identical23.
III. 2.1   Cross-sectional analyses
Cross-sectional analyses are conducted at the NUTS 2- as well as the more aggregated NUTS
1-level for both the national (GCCF) as well as the EU perspective (GCCFEU) of relative
specialisation. Results for the NUTS 2-level are displayed in Table 1a and Table 1b. The best
                                                                                                                                                        
Unsurprisingly, these all turn out to be highly correlated with gross domestic product (see Table A8a and Table
A8b in the appendix). Due to this fact, only one of these variables can be included in the explanation of the
strength of specialisation of gross fixed capital formation. Preference has hereby been accorded to the GDP
variable (which is a good proxy for market size). In most cases, the substitution of GDP by any of the other
variables does change the results only negligibly, i.e. the estimated coefficients and models are very robust. In
some cases, the use of another variable instead of GDP, e.g. population, would have improved the overall
goodness of the estimation. However, GDP was used in the estimations what did not lead to differing results.
21 In the analysis of sectoral agglomeration or concentration, distances are usually supposed to capture trade
costs. Up to a certain level, decreasing transport costs might strengthen agglomeration tendencies. But once
reaching this level, theory tells that dispersion factors (such as factor costs in the periphery) can be stronger. The
variable’s sign is thus not expected ex ante by theory. However, as we focus on regional aspects in this analysis,
the simplest and most consistent interpretation of the variable “distance to the economic centre” is that it
captures the effect of being far away from the economically most important regions, i.e. the impacts of the
peripheral location of a given region.
22 However, most coefficients as well as the LR tests on the inclusion of further variables are significant at the
5%- or even the 1%-level of significance.
23 As data is only available for 1985 to 1994, instrumental variable cross-section analyses for 1985 had to be
omitted. For the same reason, only 30 out of 53 (56) observations can be included in the regressions for 1986 so
that the IV estimates cannot capture the same effects as the simple GLS regression. However, for all other years,
the same effects can be demonstrated as in the GLS estimates.
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models identified which are displayed in both tables differ a bit. In many cases, identical
models for both, GCCF and GCCFEU are significant as well, however, the best estimates
have been chosen according to the criteria given above. Coefficients rarely change in their
size and never in their sign. The higher gross domestic product and the bigger the size of the
region, the more similar relative sectoral shares of gross fixed capital formation turn out to be.
In contrast, an increase in the unemployment rate as well as the fact of being a central
(economically important) region increase the level of investment specialisation. In some
years, population density seems to capture the effect usually picked up by the indicator
variable for the central region. Both variables therefore appear to reflect a form of centrality
effect. In some years, the number of patents shows a significant increasing effect on the level
of specialisation as well.
Table 1a: Cross-sectional analysis: Determinants of GCCF, NUTS 2-regions
year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
constant 5.6389 0.5047 0.3978 0.9713 1.2534 0.4828 -2.0743 -1.9057 0.4314 0.4053
6.8 18.24 7.48 3.23 4.6 18.68 -4.65 -3.97 10.98 9.91
gdp -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0024 -0.0032 -0.0075 -0.0072
-3.54 -2.95 -2.94 -2.00 -2.53 -2.78 -4.23 -4.61 -6.88 -6.57
zentrreg 0.2533 0.1742 0.1748 0.0946 0.1498 0.1391 0.1882 0.2614 0.3507 0.3758
4.38 2.13 2.3 1.26 2.24 1.83 3.28 3.96 5.46 5.84
uewp 0.0090 0.0068 0.0054 0.0051 0.0084 0.0088
2.11 2.01 1.74 1.71 2.25 2.56
area -0.0061 -0.0054 -0.0042 -0.0035 -0.0052
-4.18 -4.04 -3.03 -2.82 -3.85
quinn_openn -0.5119 -0.0536 -0.0789 0.1817 0.1757
-6.21 -1.89 -3.03 5.59 4.94
centr 0.2392
3.18
pat 0.0002 0.0002 0.0012 0.0012
2.51 2.64 4.99 4.83
no. obs. 30 53 53 53 53 53 52 52 31 30
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Z-values of GLS-estimates are given in the line below the coefficients. The probability of the Chi²-test
gives the overall fit of the model. For abbreviations see Table A2 and A3 in the appendix.
Only the interpretation of the empirical influence of the liberalisation indicator taken from
Quinn (1997, 2000)24 is ambiguous as it shows first negative and, since 1990, positive signs.
Since these liberalisation indicators are not available at the regional level, but only at the
country level, they might pick up country-specific effects in cross-sectional analyses.
Controlling for this potential effect, country-specific dummies are added to the presented
estimations. These country dummies are relative to Italy as the Italian data is available for all
sectors and years. As a result, the liberalisation indicators indeed loose their significance in
most cases25 or are even dropped due to problems of high collinearity with the country
dummies. However, only for few of the yearly regressions (1986, 1990, 1993, and 1994 for
GCCF as well as 1990 for GCCFEU), the equation including country-specific indicators is
statistically better according to the AIC and the likelihood ratio test result26. In addition, the
country-specific dummies are – except for the Belgian dummy - rarely significant. This
                                                
24 This indicator differentiates between varying levels of liberalisation over time. Its construction is explained in
the appendix.
25 Exceptions are only 1988 and 1989 for GCCF. Here, the Belgian country dummy is dropped in the estimates
instead.
26 Results for the regressions including country dummies are available from the author upon request.
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indicates that on the one hand the effects captured by Quinn’s liberalisation indicator cannot
be picked up equally by country-specific dummies for the different years. On the other hand,
we cannot exclude that in these cross-section regressions the liberalisation indicator does not
actually measure additional effects or even other impacts. More reliable results will be gained
in the pooled regressions as the indicators’ variation over time is exploited.
Table 1b: Cross-sectional analysis: Determinants of GCCFEU, NUTS 2-regions
year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
constant 2.2736 0.4643 0.4230 0.4238 0.4563 -0.0480 -1.2992 -0.9289 0.4454 0.4353
3.06 10.34 10.29 11.95 15.58 -0.32 -3.27 -1.73 13.9 11.23
gdp -0.0025 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0011
-4.44 -2.04 -2.02 -1.8 -2.81 -2.89 -2.91 -2.31 -3.78 -2.76
zentrreg 0.1891 0.1031 0.1210 0.0841 0.1281 0.1097 0.1861
3.7 2.22 2.8 1.97 3.23 2.58 3.6
uewp 0.0078 0.0085 0.0111 0.0093 0.0065 0.0057 0.0078 0.0105 0.0086 0.0081
2.21 2.26 3.23 3.28 2.46 1.97 2.96 2.71 3.23 2.82
poden 0.0489 0.0487 0.0517
2.73 3.65 3.35
area -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0031 -0.0025
-3.92 -4.2 -3.38 -2.91
quinn_openn -0.1798 0.0375 0.1269 0.0989
-2.46 3.41 4.39 2.54
centr 0.1550
2.35
no. obs. 30 56 56 56 56 56 53 56 34 34
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: see Table 1a.
Besides these inconclusive impacts of the liberalisation indicator, we find plausible and
consistent signs for all other coefficients for which significant results are demonstrable. In
addition, these coefficients are very robust with respect to the estimation method (i.e. OLS,
GLS, IV estimates) as well as to changes in the estimated model or the substitution of gross
domestic product by one of the other variables proxying market size such as population. Only
for the years 1993 and 1994, the econometric results are not as reliable as in the other years.
This is due to the lower number of regions with available data - e.g. for all French regions
data is missing.
Changing our focus from NUTS 2- to the more aggregated NUTS 1-level, results – displayed
in Table 2a and Table 2b - are very similar27. Gross domestic product and the unemployment
rate prove to have a significant impact on the level of GCCF in almost all years and on
GCCFEU in many years. Central or core regions still show a higher level of relative
investment specialisation at NUTS 2-level while population density now demonstrates a joint
increasing effect on specialisation in many years. However, if both variables are jointly
significant, the size of both coefficients is consistently lower. Only the size of the region does
not show a significant and consistent influence at this aggregation level. As NUTS 1-regions
are higher aggregated and usually consist of a number of NUTS 2-regions, their size differs
much less. In addition, bigger regions are naturally more diversified, so this result is not
surprising.
                                                
27 Again, instrumental variables estimations have been conducted by use of the lagged unemployment rate and
the lagged gross domestic product variable as instruments. Like for the NUTS 2-level, results have been very
similar to the simple GLS regressions at the NUTS 1-level.
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Table 2a: Cross-sectional analysis: Determinants of GCCF, NUTS 1-regions
year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
constant 0.1943 0.1230 0.1750 0.1920 0.2298 0.3111 0.2810 0.2315 0.3261 0.2939
2.1 1.79 2.87 3.58 4.66 9.43 4.85 3.98 4.19 6.76
gdp -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0010
-1.96 -1.72 -2.3 -2.32 -2.89 -2.32 -3.37 -3.23
zentrreg 0.1305 0.1539 0.1963 0.2505 0.1419 0.2683 0.1637
2.19 2.38 4.06 4.91 1.77 4.76 2.39
uewp 0.0136 0.0155 0.0126 0.0108 0.0087 0.0071 0.0106 0.0095
2.43 3.46 3.18 3.11 2.58 1.63 2.45 2.17
poden 0.0701 0.0413 0.0383 0.0339 0.0618 0.0693 0.0923
5.79 2.57 2.19 1.54 3.26 4.38 5.5
centr -0.0600
-0.68
pop -0.0331
-3.37
no. obs. 22 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 22 14
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0018 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006
Note: see Table 1a.
Table 2b: Cross-sectional analysis: Determinants of GCCFEU, NUTS 1-regions
year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
constant 1.2197 0.2591 0.3824 0.4627 0.4411 0.4402 0.4031 0.2310 0.4548 0.2947
4.55 5.99 12.67 17.99 20.33 21.86 10.38 6.43 12.34 6.36
gdp -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0012
-5.38 -2.97 -2.52 -2.75 -2.85 -3.36 -2.83
zentrreg 0.2154 0.0784 0.1297 0.0678 0.0788 0.1290 0.2184 0.0904
4.24 2.05 3.22 1.84 2.36 4.42 5.78 2.61
uewp 0.0119 0.0050 0.0163 0.0073
3.34 1.7 4.82 2.73
poden 0.0310 0.0361 0.0345 0.0589 0.0625 0.0757
2.15 2.82 2.7 4.38 4.34 7.53
area 0.0019 0.0026
2.07 3.19
quinn_openn -0.0694
-2.87
pat -0.0002
-2.43
centr 0.1722 0.1400
3.11 2.6
no. obs. 22 33 33 33 33 33 30 33 25 17
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: see Table 1a.
Only in few years, the estimations significantly improve according to the AIC and the LR test
results when adding country-specific variables (1988 and 1991 for GCCF; 1986 and 1992 for
GCCFEU). Solely the Belgian country dummy is significant in few cases (1989 and 1991)
with respect to the estimates for GCCF. Analysing GCCFEU, Ireland, Denmark, and
Luxembourg prove to have significant country dummies in some years as well. However,
their significance is rather inconsistent over time. The inclusion of country dummies therefore
does not really improve estimates at NUTS 1-level. Analogously, the Quinn liberalisation
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indicator is also not significant any more – besides of the year 1985 for GCCFEU. This might
be the result of the decreased number of regions included at NUTS 1-level and therefore even
lower variation of the openness indicator. When adding country-specific dummies, the Quinn-
indicator of openness of 1985 still remains significant while the country dummies do not
improve the estimation.
III. 2.2   Pooled estimates and panel data analyses
In the following, a number of results for pooled data and panel estimations are presented.
Pooled data estimates, given in Table 3a and 3b, display results very similar to those of the
cross-section analyses. Since regressions including patents as explanatory variables only start
in 1989 (due to the data availability), two regression models are displayed for the two
different time periods when relevant. However, all regressions are robust as the coefficients
for the other exogenous variables do hardly change. Again, higher gross domestic product and
a bigger size of a region diminish the level of specialisation of this region while a higher
unemployment rate, population density28 and the fact of being a central region increase its
level. The influence of the distance to this central region on the level of specialisation is
positive as well. The more peripheral a region is, the less similar is its sectoral structure to the
average structure of its country as well as of the EU.
This time, the inclusion of country-specific effects, again relative to Italy, generally improves
the estimates according to the AIC and likelihood ratio tests. However, only Belgian regions
turn out to have a significantly higher level of GCCF compared to Italian regions. In the
regressions for GCCFEU - which in addition to Belgian, Italian, French and British regions
also include Ireland, Denmark, and Luxembourg as a NUTS 1- or NUTS 2-region – all
country-specific indicator variables are generally significant. Besides the Belgian regions,
which are again marked by a significantly higher level of specialisation than the Italian
regions, all other regions have a significantly lower level of specialisation. But we cannot be
sure that the significant positive fixed country effect for Belgium is due to country-specific
characteristics. However, this dummy might also capture the poor quality of the Belgian data.
In contrast to fixed country effects, fixed time effects estimated relative to 1994 never
improve the estimates (see Table A10).
We are now, finally, aware of a consistent positive impact of liberalisation on the level of
specialisation. The Quinn openness indicator is not only significant in most of the pooled
regressions, it also remains significant in the improved estimates including country-specific
dummies. Its significance is even stronger in the estimations for GCCFEU which include a
higher number of countries. Again, we get no differing results for both, GCCF and GCCFEU,
when conducting instrumental-variable regressions to exclude potential problems of
endogeneity (see Table A11)29.
                                                
28 The coefficient for population density, however, changes its sign in the estimates for GCCFEU at NUTS 2-
level when including country-specific dummies. Running separate estimates for either population density or the
central region dummy, we get positive signs again.
29 In this table, we display the results for the first lag of GDP and UEWP used as instruments. We also tested for
robustness by using GDP and UEWP lagged two periods. However, the results did hardly change.
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Table 3a: Panel estimates, pooled regressions: Determinants of GCCF
NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 1 NUTS 1 NUTS 1
1985-94 1985-94 1989-94 1989-94 1985-94 1985-94 1989-94 1989-94
constant 0.3794 0.2317 0.3084 0.2329 0.0703 0.0391 -0.0422 0.1071
8.87 5.61 4.42 3.43 1.47 0.85 -0.62 1.49
gdp -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0018
-7.41 -7.3 -6.49 -4.94 -5.78 -6.3 -5.53 -6.46
zentrreg 0.1024 0.1799 0.0835 0.1700 0.1530 0.1987 0.1334 0.1663
3.13 5.89 2.07 4.52 6.18 8.37 4.68 6.33
uewp 0.0045 0.0055 0.0039 0.0048 0.0089 0.0084 0.0061 0.0059
3.72 5.01 2.76 3.76 6.76 6.82 4.18 4.41
poden 0.0279 0.0033 0.0394 0.0136 0.0510 0.0269 0.0576 0.0374
3.58 0.45 4.16 1.5 8.62 4.2 8.41 5.33
area -0.0056 -0.0040 -0.0044 -0.0029 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0006
-10.94 -6.88 -6.44 -3.59 -1.02 -0.87 1.64 2.41
quinn_openn 0.0045 0.0069 0.0105 0.0072 0.0100 0.0107 0.0223 0.0105
1.39 2.33 2.03 1.47 2.70 3.06 4.13 2.00
pat 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4.01 2.65 3.71 4.19
centr 0.0118 0.1178 -0.0094 0.1108 0.0754 0.1348 0.0458 0.0847
0.59 5.73 -0.32 3.51 3.45 6.11 1.73 3.3
dum_fra 0.0272 0.0103 0.0120 -0.0381
2.35 0.55 0.81 -1.86
dum_bel 0.1613 0.1569 0.1290 0.0998
10.44 7.93 6.77 4.7
dum_ukd -- -- -0.0005 -0.0395
-0.05 -2.68
no. obs. 463 463 267 267 268 268 151 151
SSR 4.811 3.887 2.365 1.896 1.510 1.267 0.639 0.489
Log Likeli 400.232 449.593 252.130 281.613 313.720 337.214 198.312 218.557
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AIC -1.694 -1.899 -1.821 -2.027 -2.281 -2.434 -2.507 -2.736
Note: see Table 1a.
In contrast to the cross-section estimates presented above, time correlation effects might be of
importance in panel data. This means that autocorrelation of the residuals cannot be excluded
a priori. In order to take account of these potential effects, the lagged endogenous variable is
included in the estimates to capture possible first-order serial correlation effects. The use of
other, more sophisticated specifications of dynamic adjustments is possible30. However, the
methodological discussion about the optimal dynamic specification in the econometric
analysis of panel data is still ongoing. We therefore only include the endogenous variable
lagged one period when checking the robustness of the above presented results. Table A11
shows the estimates of this specification for the NUTS 2-regions. In the estimates with
country fixed effects, almost all coefficients remain significant and their sign unchanged31 –
only the population density variable generally looses its explanatory power. However, the
empirical impact of the variables identified so far is mostly confirmed.
                                                
30 See Baltagi (1995) for an account of this issue.
31 The size of the exogenous variables‘ coefficients naturally changes due to the dynamic relation specification of
the relationship.
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Table 3b: Panel estimates, pooled regressions: Determinants of GCCFEU
NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 1
1985-94 1985-94 1989-94 1989-94 1985-94 1985-94
constant 0.3453 0.3112 0.2734 0.3687 0.2593 0.2778
9.57 8.6 4.5 6.25 6.35 6.75
gdp -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0005
-7.14 -7.38 -5.01 -6.04 -4.16 -3.8
zentrreg 0.1216 0.2342 0.0849 0.1856 0.1013 0.1558
6.58 8.5 4.08 5.81 7.02 6.83
uewp 0.0087 0.0075 0.0085 0.0075 0.0072 0.0067
8.54 7.66 6.58 6.37 6.73 5.67
poden 0.0136 -0.0134 0.0267 0.0017 0.0359 0.0321
2.3 -2 3.58 0.21 8.06 5.23
area -0.0032 -0.0021 -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002
-8.76 -3.94 -3.66 0.29 -1.85 1.06
quinn_openn 0.0072 0.0068 0.0130 0.0058 0.0063 0.0062
2.6 2.63 2.88 1.36 1.97 2
pat 0.0001 0.0002
2.77 3.8
centr 0.0513 0.1237 0.0606 0.0356
3.00 6.66 3.03 1.68
dum_fra -0.0208 -0.0681 -0.0506
-1.99 -4.25 -3.57
dum_bel 0.0920 0.0539 -0.0430
6.6 3.49 -2.35
dum_ire -0.0504 -0.1136 -0.0967
-0.97 -1.75 -2.78
dum_lux -0.1970 -0.2613 -0.0927
-4.82 -5.32 -2.56
dum_den -0.1249 -0.1654 -0.1485
-3.02 -3.31 -4.77
dum_ukd -- -- -0.0011
-0.10
no. obs. 487 487 282 282 292 292
SSR 3.9500 3.3305 2.1533 1.6841 1.4399 1.2745
Log Likeli 481.32 522.86 287.22 321.87 361.25 379.06
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AIC -1.944 -2.094 -1.98 -2.191 -2.42 -2.5
Note: see Table 1a.
Throughout all regressions, the predicted values were in the range between 0 and 1, so that
our restricted endogenous variable did not impose an econometric modelling problem. The
use of a logistic transformation of the regression specification – limiting the range of y to lie
in the interval 0,1 – is a more sophisticated procedure, but does not change our results as none
of the predicted values lies at the outer sides of the given range. The results for additional
pooled regressions in logit terms are presented in the appendix Table A12.
In order to further exploit the time and cross-sectional structure of the data and to check for
robustness of our results, fixed effects (within) estimates and between estimates are conducted
additionally32. Fixed effects estimates control for region-specific differences by adding a
                                                
32 First-difference estimates – explaining the change in the level of specialisation – are not convincing neither at
the NUTS 2- nor at the NUTS 1-level. This might largely be due to the fact that many of the explanatory
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specific constant for each region33. Within estimates (“WE”) explain the deviation of the
regional observations from their respective group (regional) means, thereby excluding all
region-specific determinants from these fixed effects estimates. Within estimates thus provide
us with further insights on the variation within the groups (in our case within the regions).
Between effects (“BE”), in contrast, explain the variation between the different groups only
focusing on the groups’ means and on region-specific characteristics34.
By means of fixed effects within estimates, only few significant impacts can be detected. For
the panel of all NUTS 2- (NUTS 1-)regions, only population density consistently proves to be
a relevant exogenous variable in explaining the variation of the level of regional specialisation
over time. Since the variation of population density over time within a region is of minor
extent, this effect is not really convincing. All in all, the within-estimates do not contribute to
the explanation of regional specialisation patterns within the groups.
Table 4: Panel estimations: Determinants of investment specialisation
Nuts 2 Nuts 2 Nuts 1 Nuts 1 Nuts 2 Nuts 2 Nuts 1 Nuts 1
gccf gccfeu gccf gccfeu gccf gccfeu gccf gccfeu
WE WE WE WE BE BE BE BE
constant 0.7309 0.6376 0.5227 0.6551 0.4705 0.4289 0.1804 0.3203
4.59 8.64 6.09 7.20 19.04 13.1 3.14 8.43
gdp 0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0004
1.800 -2.86 -2.46 -2.06 -1.72
zentrreg 0.0108 0.1308 0.0842
3.58 2.05 2.9
uewp 0.0063 0.0117 0.0095
3.8 3.03 3.52
poden -1.2271 -0.5514 -0.6952 -0.6475 0.0463 0.1200 0.0508 0.0375
-2.50 -2.29 -3.49 -2.87 2.76 3.13 2.91 3.38
area -0.0053 -0.0033
-4.42 -3.95
pat 0.0003
1.83
no. obs. 267 487 268 292 463 487 268 292
no. groups 52 56 30 33 53 56 30 33
R² within 0.0398 0.0121 0.093 0.0397 0.0012 0.0000 0.0303 0.0122
R² between 0.2218 0.1026 0.4322 0.3518 0.5262 0.4371 0.7210 0.6543
R² overall 0.2050 0.0886 0.4007 0.2924 0.4594 0.3492 0.6481 0.5048
Prob F 0.0132 0.0225 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: T-values are given in the line below the coefficients. For abbreviations, see Table A2 and A3 in
the appendix. WE stands for fixed effects (within) estimates and BE for between estimates.
In additional fixed effects estimates with explicit region-specific constants, we find that the
region-specific constants are generally significant at the 1%-level and turn out to be the most
important determinants in the explanation of the specialisation levels. Only in the estimates
for GCCF at NUTS 2-level, two regional constants (being the one for Île de France and the
one for Rhône-Alpes) are not significant when including the number of patents as a
determinant and thus running the regression only for the shorter time period. The region-
                                                                                                                                                        
variables are simply eliminated by the construction of the first difference. This is the case for the indicator
variable for central regions, but also for the only slightly varying variables such as the size of a region, the
degree of liberalisation, population density as well as the distance to the economic centre of the respective
country.
33 Using this approach, we have to omit the overall constant.
34 For further details on panel data analyses, see e.g. Baltagi (1995).
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specific constants’ levels differ largely in these estimations. The one of Bruxelles-capital is
always the highest, usually at a large distance to even the second largest regional constant. In
the econometric analysis of GCCFEU we find all regional constants to be significant for the
specification at the NUTS 2-level. However, the fixed effects estimates at NUTS 1-level
strongly improve when excluding the – hardly varying – population density variable from the
specification. And again, we find the fixed regional effects to be the only dominant impact on
specialisation in these estimates. Though we have a – sometimes not negligible – variation of
the specialisation level of one region over time, this variation can only be explained by the
presented estimates to a minor extent. The change in the level of specialisation of one region
over time might therefore not underlie systematic changes but rather be the result of random
disturbances35.
In contrast to the rather low explanatory power of these within estimates are the results of
between effects estimates (“BE”) which explain the variation of the level of specialisation
between regions. The results are very similar to those of the cross-sectional and the pooled
regressions presented above. Gross domestic product, regional size, the unemployment rate,
population density, the indicator variable for the central region as well as the distance to the
economic centre of the respective country are of the same sign and about the same size as in
the other regressions.
All explanatory variables are consistently significant in pooled and between estimates and are
of strong importance in the explanation of systematic differences in the specialisation levels.
The variation over time, though, is not explained by our regressions. It is now evident that
regional characteristics determine the respective level of specialisation while the variation
within a region over time cannot be found to be of systematic nature.
IV Economic perspectives and effects of EU integration
The regression results we find in cross-sectional and pooled regression analyses as well as
between effects estimates consistently point to a high importance of market size, regional size,
the location in the centre, the distance to the centre, and the population density of a region as
well as the unemployment rate and economic and capital market integration in the explanation
of relative regional investment specialisation. Our results on the impacts of market size, the
population density of a region and of capital market or economic liberalisation on
specialisation levels are in line with Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (1999) who found
lower population, higher population density and higher risk-sharing (as a proxy for capital
market integration) to increase regional specialisation of production. In addition, we
controlled for the effect of further economic variables, in particular the unemployment rate,
the number of patents of a region as well as its distance from the centre.
Market size reflects the economic as well as demand potential of a region. The better it is, the
lower relative investment specialisation tends to be. However, this significant impact of
market size is in contrast to the increasing impact of market size on sectoral agglomeration
empirically found by Haaland et al. (1999) and Tirado, Paluzie and Pons (2000). While –
according to their results – firms tend to locate close to large markets, our empirical results
show that regions with a larger market seem to attract capital of all types of sectors with a
more even relative allocation (hence showing a lower level of relative regional specialisation)
                                                
35 It is also possible that measurement errors as well as the changing number of available sectors have some
influence on the variation of the level of regional concentration over time which then naturally cannot be
explained by economic determinants.
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than smaller markets. Economic activity in regions with a lower gross domestic product
seems to be specialised to a higher degree. However, the determinants of the location of
particular sectors across EU regions is not subject of this study.
Table 5: Impact of economic variables on the level of specialisation
Economic variable Sign of impact on GCCFEU
Gross domestic product -
Fact of being a central region +
Unemployment per working population +
Population density +
Size if a region -
Indicator of openness +
Distance to economic centre +
Patents +
In addition to regions with a larger market size, regions with a bigger size tend to have a more
similar relative distribution of investments. But the significance of the regional size variable
might simply be due to the fact that bigger regions are logically more diversified in their
production structure than smaller regions. The fact that NUTS 1-regions are less varying in
their size as well as more evenly diversified than NUTS 2-regions leads to an insignificant
size variable at the NUTS 1-level. This demonstrates that it is very important to analyse
equally big regions. Thus preference has to be accorded to regions as small as possible to
avoid that aggregation cancels out potential specialisation patterns. Controlling for regional
size effects in the estimates is therefore essential.
In contrast to the fact that larger markets do not show a strong investment specialisation in
only few sectors is the result we find for a number of economically very important regions:
Central regions (and equally regions with a high population density) demonstrate a
significantly higher level of relative investment specialisation. This increasing effect
counteracts the decreasing impact of the large market size. But, the high importance of the
centrality indicator variable which captures an outstanding strong fixed effect for Brussels,
Lazio, and the Île de France is in line with polarisation theory and new economic geography
which predict cumulative causation and self-reinforcing agglomeration. Regions having once
gained a particularly high potential of market or factor access attract further firms.
Supposedly, sectors with firms underlying positive economies of scale or economies of
localisation expand in the core.
In addition, the impact of the distance of a given region to its (economic) centre on the level
of specialisation is positive. This means that peripheral regions are more different from the
average EU structure than regions closer to the centre. Both, the high specialisation of core as
well as of peripheral regions is in line with new economic geography predictions. In contrast
to the specialisation of core regions, we expect the specialisation of peripheral regions to
occur in sectors with low economies of scale and possibly high labour-intensity. However, the
sectoral patterns of regional specialisation remain the subject of further research.
The impact of European integration on specialisation patterns is captured by the influence of
market liberalisation and openness. In this context, capital market integration which improves
the potential mobility of capital is especially important when regarding dissimilarities in the
allocation of relative investments. In addition to the direct measuring of the impacts of
economic openness presented above we therefore also tested for the influence of capital
market integration in the pooled estimates. This is displayed in Table A12. All explanatory
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coefficients are in general very similar to the coefficients in the models with the openness
indicator. The correlation between both indicators is about 0.77 (0.68) for the regions at
NUTS 2-level (NUTS 1-level). The indicator of liberalisation of capital accounts ranges
between 0.5 and 4 while the economic openness indicator goes up to 14 when perfect
openness is reached. As a consequence the coefficient of the capital account liberalisation
indicator is higher than the other coefficient in our estimates. However, we cannot conclude
on a difference in the strength of the indicators’ influence from this fact.
The results of our regressions clearly demonstrate an increasing impact of liberalisation on
investment specialisation, so that the perfect liberalisation and capital market integration
within EMU seem to further augment specialisation patterns. Instead of a stronger
diversification, European regions might end up with an increasingly different relative
investment structure in the process of market integration. If this effect continues, further
liberalisation would lead to a higher risk of asymmetric shocks. However, specialisation need
not always be negative even though production structures become less diversified. The
specialisation in an industrial sector providing a high growth potential might be an asset and
improve the regional competitiveness in spite of a highly asymmetric industrial structure.
The unemployment rate reflects negative economic performance of a region (not accounting
for migration effects etc.). The worse the economic performance is, the stronger the structural
dissimilarity to the average patterns of EU turns out to be in our empirical analyses. The
number of patents of a region is significant in many estimations as well, though not in all. Its
coefficient is mostly positive, i.e. we have a first indication that a higher number of patents
increases relative regional specialisation as well. Possibly patents only attract investments of
very particular sectors as they play a strong role in many important, but not in all sectors.
This study is limited with respect to two aspects. First, we deal with regional patterns without
taking into account regional interdependencies which are probable when analysing regional
effects and especially specialisation tendencies. Further improvements of the estimations
could thus be achieved by controlling for spatial autocorrelation effects. The appropriate tool
for such an analysis would be the use of spatial econometrics. Second, our analysis focuses on
the determinants of regional investment specialisation levels. We find some evidence for the
stronger specialisation of regions in the extreme localisations core and periphery. As
mentioned above, the further analysis of sectoral patterns of relative specialisation is an
important aspect when focusing on regional specialisation to detect possible regional
imbalances by e.g. core-periphery patterns of the localisation of capital-intensive or growth-
oriented sectors.
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Appendix
Data description
The regional disaggregation of the data is given according to the Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics (NUTS - Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques). The REGIO
database disaggregates data for the three aggregation levels NUTS 1, 2 and 3. However, data
for GFCF is not available further disaggregated than the NUTS 2-level. In addition, it is not
complete (with regard to the regional and/or the sectoral disaggregation – the latter needed for
the calculation of the specialisation indices). Data availability is sufficient for the seven
countries given below. Here, the UK does not provide data disaggregated further than NUTS
1-level. Luxembourg, Denmark as well as Ireland are only regarded as one single region at the
NUTS 1- as well as at the NUTS 2-level (=monoregional countries). The maximum number
of regions available is therefore 33 at the NUTS 1-level and 56 at the NUTS 2-level.
 Table A1: Regional data for GFCF from the REGIO database
Country NUTS
level
Respective national
disaggregation level
Number of
regions
NUTS 1
Number of
regions
NUTS 2
UK 1 Groups of Counties or
local authority regions
11
(with 3 n.a.)
n.a.
Belgium 2 Provinces 3 11
France 2 Régions 8 22
Italy 2 Regioni 11 20
Denmark 1&2 - 1 1
Ireland 1&2 - 1 1
Luxembourg 1&2 - 1 1
Total number of regions 33 (+ 3 n.a.) 56
Note: Version of NUTS 1995. French oversea departments (DOM – départements
outre-mer) are not counted in total sums for France as well as for the EU.
Data is taken from the Eurostat REGIO Database (yearbooks up to 2000) which – for gross
fixed capital formation - comprises data for the years 1985 to 1994. All data included in the
analysis is based on ESA79.
Table A2: List of explanatory variables, REGIO Database
abbreviation variable unit
gfcf Gross Fixed Capital Formation Currency: Billions of ECU
totem Total Employment in 1000 persons
coe Compensation of employees Currency: Billions of ECU
vafp Gross value added at factor costs Currency: Billions of ECU
gdp Gross domestic product Currency: Billions of ECU
pat European R&D patent applications total number
uewp Total Unemployment rates in % OF WORKING POPULATION
pop Total annual average population in Mio. PERSONS 
poden Population density in 1000 INHABITANTS/KM2
In addition to the available national account data, a number of further variables has been used
in the econometric analysis. The distance to the centre (centr) captures peripheral effects. It is
measured by the optimal route distance between the regional capital and the centre of the
respective country. Centres are Paris, Rome, London and Brussels. The distance is defined to
be 1 for Denmark, Luxembourg as well as Ireland, and it is equally 1 for the regions
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containing the capital of the respective country. Central and economically important regions
(zentrreg) in the analysis are Île de France (France), Brussels (Belgium), and Lazio (Italy).
Table A3: List of further explanatory variables
abbreviation variable unit
centr distance to centre, proxy for transport costs  metres
zentrreg regional dummy set for central region 0 or 1
quinn_openn indicator of openness per country 0-14 (variation by 0.5)
quinn_ca indicator of capital account liberalisation per country 0-4 (variation by 0.5)
Available indicators of liberalisation arising from official sources are mostly indicator
variables being either 0 or 1. However, such indicator variables do not allow to differentiate
the varying levels of control or to capture a decreasing level of control over time. Measuring a
level of integration for each year is therefore a better solution from an econometric point of
view. Quinn (1997, 2000) has constructed such a yearly index of openness on the basis of
those restrictions published by the IMF since the 1950s. This index is scaled from 0 (highest
degree of restrictions) up to 14 (highest degree of liberalisation) and aggregates the different
indicators of liberalisation progress in seven specified fields (capital in – and outflows, im–
and exports of goods and of services as well as international conventions of liberalisation)
with a respective degree of liberalisation between 0.5 and 2.
Quinn weighs quantitative restrictions of imports for example the highest (i.e. he attributes the
lowest partial liberalisation index of 0 in case of full and 0.5 in case of partly quantitative
restrictions), existence of laws requiring the approval of international transactions are scored
1, taxes 1.5 and finally free trade 2. With regard to capital account liberalisation, Quinn
attributes 0 in case of required approval for capital transactions which are rarely granted, 0.5
(1) in case of occasional (frequent) approval and finally 1.5 in case of taxing measurements
(without the need of an official approval). A subindex of the overall liberalisation index is a
financial liberalisation indicator ranging on a score between 0 and 4 which is aggregated from
restrictions of capital inward and outward flows in the way explained above. All named
potential indicators, however, are only available at country, not regional, level, which has to
be taken into account in econometric analysis. Detailed restrictions for Luxembourg are not
available as Luxembourg and Belgium are part of a common monetary union since the 1950s.
In our analysis the „Quinn-indicator“ for Luxembourg is therefore naturally set equal to the
one of Belgium.
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Table A4: Investment specialisation levels in EU regions in 1985-94 in relation to national countries 
(Standardised Gini-coefficients/ 17 sectors)
France Italy Belgium United Kingdom
Basse-Normandie 0.626 Valle d'Aosta 0.538 Bruxelles-capitale 0.734 Note: Sectoral availability is strongly 
Corse 0.512 Basilicata 0.497 Luxembourg (B) 0.666 varying in Belgium from 4 to 11 sectors.
Franche-Comté 0.389 Molise 0.481 Namur 0.656 However, mostly 11 sectors are 
Bretagne 0.368 Sardegna 0.427 Brabant Wallon 0.557 included.
Haute-Normandie 0.353 Calabria 0.422 Hainaut 0.549 Due to a change in sectoral availability 
Auvergne 0.339 Sicilia 0.389 Antwerpen 0.500 of British data (9 sectors prior to 1987,
Champagne-Ardenne 0.329 Umbria 0.355 Vlaams Brabant 0.466 4 since 1988), results for the time 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 0.323 Lazio 0.355 West-Vlaanderen 0.455 since 1988 are rather primarily and not
Limousin 0.322 Trentino-Alto Adige 0.336 Limburg (B) 0.420 directly comparable to prior years.
Poitou-Charentes 0.314 Liguria 0.331 Liège 0.399 Data has not been available for three of
Languedoc-Rousillon 0.309 Puglia 0.292 Oost-Vlaanderen 0.388 the eleven NUTS 1-regions.
Ile de France 0.288 Abruzzo 0.286
Picardie 0.278 Campania 0.285
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.266 Piemonte 0.277
Alsace 0.244 Marche 0.272
Aquitaine 0.240 Emilia-Romagna 0.269
Midi-Pyrénées 0.240 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.250
Bourgogne 0.221 Lombardia 0.225
Pays de la Loire 0.221 Toscana 0.218
Rhône-Alpes 0.215 Veneto 0.198
Lorraine 0.212
Centre (F) 0.210
Ile de France 0.288 Sardegna 0.427 Bruxelles-capitale 0.734 Northern Ireland 0.533
Méditerranée 0.281 Sicilia 0.389 Région Wallonne 0.413 Wales 0.363
Ouest 0.267 Lazio 0.355 Vlaams Gewest 0.252 West Midlands 0.316
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.266 Sud 0.293 East Anglia 0.313
Bassin Parisien 0.213 Abruzzo-Molise 0.289 Scotland 0.270
Centre-Est 0.207 Campania 0.285 Yorkshire and the Humber 0.255
Sud-Ouest 0.188 Emilia-Romagna 0.269 East Midlands 0.154
Est (F) 0.180 Lombardia 0.225 South West 0.135
Nord Ovest 0.210 South East n.a.
Centro (I) 0.177 North n.a.
Nord Est 0.173 North West n.a.
Nuts 1, 1986 to 1992 Nuts 1 Nuts 1 Nuts 1, 1985 to 1987
Nuts 2, 1986 to 1992 Nuts 2 Nuts 2
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Table A5: Investment specialisation levels in EU regions in 1985 to 1994 in relation to EU as a whole
(Standardised Gini-coefficients/ 17 sectors)
France Italy Belgium United Kingdom
Basse-Normandie 0.672 Basilicata 0.607 Luxembourg (B) 0.725 Note: Sectoral availability is strongly 
Corse 0.596 Calabria 0.590 Bruxelles-capitale 0.719 varying in Belgium from 4 to 11 sectors.
Ile de France 0.475 Molise 0.579 Namur 0.691 However, mostly 11 sectors are 
Bretagne 0.474 Valle d'Aosta 0.572 Hainaut 0.563 included.
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 0.473 Sicilia 0.566 Brabant Wallon 0.538 Due to a change in sectoral availability 
Languedoc-Rousillon 0.454 Sardegna 0.562 Antwerpen 0.503 of British data (9 sectors prior to 1987,
Franche-Comté 0.454 Lazio 0.507 West-Vlaanderen 0.491 4 since 1988), results for the time 
Auvergne 0.446 Puglia 0.492 Liège 0.479 since 1988 are rather primarily and not
Poitou-Charentes 0.424 Umbria 0.485 Vlaams Brabant 0.466 directly comparable to prior years.
Haute-Normandie 0.410 Liguria 0.454 Limburg (B) 0.446 Data has not been available for three of
Limousin 0.406 Marche 0.443 Oost-Vlaanderen 0.441 the eleven NUTS 1-regions.
Champagne-Ardenne 0.405 Abruzzo 0.442
Aquitaine 0.400 Trentino-Alto Adige 0.439
Midi-Pyrénées 0.381 Campania 0.428 Monoregional countries 
Centre (F) 0.379 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.390 Denmark 0.380
Pays de la Loire 0.364 Emilia-Romagna 0.386 Ireland 0.513
Lorraine 0.334 Toscana 0.382 Luxembourg 0.432
Bourgogne 0.333 Veneto 0.375
Picardie 0.315 Piemonte 0.373
Rhône-Alpes 0.311 Lombardia 0.311
Alsace 0.310
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.303
Ile de France 0.475 Sicilia 0.566 Bruxelles-capitale 0.719 Yorkshire and the Humber 0.471
Méditerranée 0.445 Sardegna 0.562 Région Wallonne 0.439 Wales 0.449
Ouest 0.405 Lazio 0.507 Vlaams Gewest 0.271 West Midlands 0.441
Sud-Ouest 0.361 Sud 0.500 East Midlands 0.435
Bassin Parisien 0.327 Abruzzo-Molise 0.446 East Anglia 0.424
Centre-Est 0.316 Campania 0.428 Scotland 0.399
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.303 Emilia-Romagna 0.386 South West 0.390
Est (F) 0.289 Centro (I) 0.375 Northern Ireland 0.378
Nord Est 0.359 North n.a.
Nord Ovest 0.344 North West n.a.
Lombardia 0.311 South East n.a.
Nuts 2, 1986 to 1992 Nuts 2 Nuts 2
Nuts 1, 1985 to 1987Nuts 1Nuts 1Nuts 1, 1986 to 1992
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Table A6: Characteristics of most/least specialised NUTS 2-regions – specialisation relative to national structure
(average 1985-94 unless indicated in brackets)
Region Index of
investment
specialisa-
tion (GCCF)
Index of
employment
specialisation
Regional
per capita
GDP in
Mio ECU
per 1000
GFCF in billion
ECU
GFCF
in % of
GDP
Num-
ber of
patents
[89-94]
Employ-
ment
share
(in%)
Unemploy-
ment rate
(in % of
working
population)
Net
migration
rate 1997 in
‰ of
population
NUTS 2, most specialised regions
Bruxelles-capitale   0.734   0.503  [85-92] 23.17 n.a. n.a. 71 18.0 10.82 0.1
Luxembourg (B)   0.666   0.569  [85-92] 12.57 n.a. n.a. 6  2.1   7.52 2.8
Basse-Normandie   0.626 [86-92]   0.345  [85-89] 13.15 4.25 [86-92] 24.22 59  2.5   9.87 0.4
Corsica   0.512 [86-92]   0.492  [85-89] 12.40 0.58 [86-92] 19.26 n.a.  0.4 11.18 3.1
Valle d'Aosta   0.538   0.525 17.36 0.67 33.83  2  0.3   3.95 5.4
Basilicata   0.500   0.591  8.62 1.46 28.0       1  0.9 16.67 3.1
NUTS 2, least specialised regions
Liège   0.399   0.302 [85-92] 13.55 n.a.  n.a.      33 9.2      11.67 1.4
Oost-Vlaandern   0.384   0.392 [85-92] 14.06 n.a.  n.a. 71 12.0 6.67 1.5
Lorraine   0.21 [86-92]   0.307 [85-89] 13.41        6.67 [86-92] 22.0    118 3.7 9.65 - 3.9
Centre (F)   0.21 [86-92]   0.287 [85-89] 14.53        6.83 [86-92] 20.2    147 4.2 9.63 2.0
Toscana   0.218   0.350 14.63 8.36 16.2    119 6.7 7.56 4.9
Veneto   0.198   0.356 15.48 13.05 20.2    223 8.7 5.55 4.0
Region including national capital
Ile de France   0.288 [86-92]  0.247 [85-89] 24.30 52.07 [86-92] 20.61   2232 22.6 8.29    -4.9
Lazio   0.355  0.311 15.18 16.63 21.24    147 9.3 9.75    5.2
South-East      n.a.      n.a. 15.08            n.a.  n.a.    779 33.8 7.86   25.0
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Table A7: Characteristics of most/least specialised NUTS 2 regions – specialisation relative to EU structure
(average 1985-94 unless indicated in brackets)
Region Index of
investment
specialisa-
tion
(GCCFEU)
Index of
employment
specialisa-
tion
Regional
per capita
GDP in
Mio ECU
per 1000
GFCF in billion
ECU
GFCF
in % of
GDP
Num-
ber of
patents
[89-94]
Employ-
ment
share
(in%)
Unemploy-
ment rate
(in % of
working
population)
Net
migration
rate 1997
in ‰ of
population
NUTS 2, most specialised regions
Bruxelles-capitale   0.719   0.515 [85-92] 23.17           n.a. n.a. 71 18.0 10.82 0.1
Luxembourg (B)   0.725   0.542 [85-92] 12.57 n.a. n.a. 6  2.1   7.52 2.8
Basse-Normandie   0.672 [86-92]   0.410 [85-89] 13.15 4.247 [86-92] 24.22 59 2.5   9.87 0.4
Corsica   0.596 [86-92]   0.523 [85-89] 12.40 0.583 [86-92] 19.26 n.a. 0.4 11.18 3.1
Basilicata   0.607   0.648  8.62         1.462   28.0       1 0.9 16.67 3.1
Calabria   0.590   0.697  7.90         4.222 25.56       3 2.9 19.31 -3.2
NUTS 2, least specialised regions
Limburg (B)   0.446   0.302 [85-92] 14.05 n.a.  n.a.      21   6.7 10.34   0
Oost-Vlaandern   0.441   0.397 [85-92] 14.06 n.a.  n.a. 71 12.0   6.67  1.5
Alsace   0.310 [86-92]   0.247 [85-90] 16.2        6.058 [86-92] 23.45    215   2.9   6.28  1.1
Nord-Pas-de-Calais   0.303 [86-92]   0.265 [85-89] 13.02        9.877 [86-92] 19.67    125   5.9 13.12 -3.9
Piemonte   0.373   0.367 15.48      12.865 19.12    306   8.4  7.08  2.8
Lombardia   0.311   0.373 17.55      27.849 17.90    806  17.2  4.97  3.9
Region including national capital
Ile de France   0.475 [86-92]   0.277 [85-89] 24.30 52.066 [86-92] 20.61   2232 22.6 8.29  -4.9
Lazio   0.507   0.359 15.18       16.626 21.24    147 9.3 9.75   5.2
South-East      n.a. n.a. 15.08            n.a.  n.a.    779 33.8 7.86  25.0
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Table A8a: Correlation matrix NUTS 1-level: multicollinear variables
gdp gfcf vafp pop totem coe
gdp 1
gfcf 0.9456 1
vafp 0.9984 0.9555 1
pop 0.8535 0.8267 0.8574 1
totem 0.9383 0.877 0.936 0.9496 1
coe 0.9826 0.9044 0.973 0.8456 0.9349 1
Table A8b: Correlation matrix NUTS 2-level: multicollinear variables
gdp gfcf vafp pop totem coe
gdp 1
gfcf 0.9039 1
vafp 0.9994 0.9027 1
pop 0.9118 0.8473 0.9138 1
totem 0.9667 0.8755 0.967 0.9726 1
coe 0.9936 0.9217 0.9906 0.9129 0.9652 1
Table A9a: Correlation matrix NUTS 1-level: explanatory variables
gccf gccfeu gdp zentrreg quinn_openn uewp poden centr
gccf 1
gccfeu 0.6548 1
gdp -0.37 -0.3161 1
zentrreg 0.4594 0.4739 0.2648 1
quinn_openn -0.0239 0.0361 0.1657 -0.0209 1
uewp 0.4424 0.4081 -0.4353 -0.0743 -0.0676 1
poden 0.626 0.5095 -0.1072 0.61 -0.0669 -0.0076 1
centr -0.0615 -0.0517 -0.049 -0.4859 0.0721 0.2763 -0.3271 1
Table A9b: Correlation matrix NUTS 2-level: explanatory variables
gccf gccfeu gdp zentrreg quinn_openn uewp poden centr
gccf 1
gccfeu 0.8978 1
gdp -0.391 -0.3152 1
zentrreg 0.153 0.2018 0.4548 1
quinn_openn -0.0473 0.0147 0.1289 -0.0093 1
uewp 0.1716 0.2367 -0.1423 -0.0344 -0.0671 1
poden 0.3285 0.2547 0.0684 0.618 -0.0448 -0.0345 1
centr -0.2077 -0.0631 0.0062 -0.3231 0.0886 0.4613 -0.2537 1
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Table A10: Pooled regressions including time-specific dummies
NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 1
gccfeu gccfeu gccfeu gccf gccf gccf gccf
1985-94 1989-94 1985-94 1985-94 1989-94 1985-94 1989-94
constant 0.3696 0.0604 0.3790 0.5959 0.2037 0.1669 -0.2527
3.51 0.47 3.95 4.60 1.29 1.43 -1.97
gdp -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0023 -0.0008 -0.0017
-7.16 -5.28 -4.25 -7.49 -6.50 -5.81 -5.89
zentrreg 0.1217 0.0790 0.1020 0.1056 0.0836 0.1543 0.1311
6.57 3.78 7.08 3.24 2.08 6.26 4.66
uewp 0.0088 0.0085 0.0074 0.0045 0.0040 0.0091 0.0060
8.47 6.57 6.87 3.71 2.76 6.75 4.07
poden 0.0135 0.0277 0.0355 0.0272 0.0394 0.0506 0.0568
2.28 3.74 8.00 3.49 4.17 8.56 8.42
area -0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0057 -0.0043 -0.0002 0.0004
-8.63 -3.12 -2.00 -10.99 -5.85 -1.07 2.00
quinn_openn 0.0051 0.0274 -0.0029 -0.0110 0.0174 0.0025 0.0375
0.69 3.05 -0.44 -1.21 1.56 0.31 4.06
pat 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
3.09 4.06 4.10
centr 0.0517 0.0615 0.0159 -0.0109 0.0762 0.0424
3.02 3.09 0.80 -0.37 3.49 1.62
year_1985 0.0156 -- -0.0313 -0.0630 -- -0.0104 --
0.44 -1.00 -1.49 -0.28
year_1986 -0.0013 -- -0.0287 -0.0552 -- -0.0204 --
-0.04 -0.97 -1.44 -0.58
year_1987 -0.0086 -- -0.0291 -0.0499 -- -0.0143 --
-0.27 -0.98 -1.3 -0.41
year_1988 -0.0142 -- -0.0167 -0.0517 -- -0.0256 --
-0.48 -0.60 -1.45 -0.77
year_1989 -0.0004 0.0612 -0.0081 -0.0501 0.0307 -0.0157 0.0575
-0.01 1.90 -0.29 -1.40 0.80 -0.47 1.78
year_1990 0.0031 0.0239 0.0001 -0.0133 0.0148 -0.0026 0.0153
0.14 1.09 0.00 -0.52 0.59 -0.10 0.63
year_1991 -0.0083 0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0133 0.0018 0.0035 0.0090
-0.41 0.11 -0.06 -0.56 0.08 0.14 0.40
year_1992 0.0190 0.0269 0.0090 0.0101 0.0230 0.0152 0.0192
0.94 1.36 0.42 0.42 1.02 0.60 0.86
year_1993 0.0068 0.0119 0.0134 -0.0020 0.0057 0.0049 0.0044
0.31 0.47 0.60 -0.08 0.24 0.19 0.19
no. obs. 487 282 292 463 267 268 151
SSR OLS 3.9062 2.1079 1.4157 4.756 2.347 1.492 0.619
Log Likeli 484.0330 290.2260 363.7200 402.9230 253.1346 315.2989 200.7544
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AIC -1.918 -1.966 -2.375 -1.667 -1.761 -2.226 -2.421
Note: see Table 1a.
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Table A11: IV-estimates and dynamic specification results, 1985-94, pooled regressions
NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 1 NUTS 1 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 2 NUTS 2
IV 2SLS gccf gccf gccfeu gccfeu gccf gccf gccfeu gccfeu dyn. model gccf gccf gccfeu gccfeu
constant 0.3782 0.2237 0.3266 0.2943 0.0633 0.0349 0.2676 0.2835 constant 0.0450 0.0285 0.0253 0.0387
8.00 4.85 8.17 7.31 1.19 0.67 6.00 6.17 1.51 0.94 0.94 1.36
gccf(eu) AR(1) 0.8159 0.7750 0.8101 0.7623
27.87 23.75 26.51 23.24
gdp (IV) -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005 gdp -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002
-6.92 -6.71 -6.67 -6.85 -5.42 -5.89 -4.01 -3.71 -2.48 -2.61 -2.05 -2.58
zentrreg 0.1010 0.1785 0.1204 0.2371 0.1558 0.2029 0.0985 0.1563 zentrreg 0.0219 0.0404 0.0186 0.0602
2.86 5.42 6.00 8.00 5.72 7.77 6.34 6.36 1.06 1.85 1.45 2.89
uewp (IV) 0.0044 0.0056 0.0089 0.0075 0.0087 0.0081 0.0072 0.0061 uewp 0.0004 0.0009 0.0014 0.0014
3.27 4.51 7.72 6.74 5.78 5.72 6.08 4.59 0.54 1.17 2.02 1.95
poden 0.0278 0.0031 0.0140 -0.0141 0.0504 0.0253 0.0353 0.0315 poden 0.0063 0.0025 0.0058 -0.0019
3.31 0.39 2.19 -1.95 7.77 3.62 7.42 4.78 1.26 0.50 1.48 -0.40
area -0.0055 -0.0039 -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 area -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0004
-9.84 -6.20 -7.59 -3.46 -0.67 -0.76 -1.64 0.86 -2.40 -2.08 -0.95 -1.00
quinn_openn 0.0046 0.0073 0.0084 0.0078 0.0107 0.0110 0.0060 0.0064 quinn_openn 0.0031 0.0039 0.0043 0.0045
1.31 2.24 2.78 2.75 2.61 2.85 1.75 1.89 1.50 1.85 2.35 2.41
centr 0.0092 0.1178 0.0480 0.1269 0.0791 0.1432 0.0548 0.0353 centr 0.0046 0.0268 0.0113 0.0342
0.43 5.27 2.58 6.31 3.26 5.86 2.53 1.53 0.36 1.81 0.99 2.48
dum_fra 0.0295 -0.0196 0.0180 --- -0.0485 dum_fra 0.0092 -0.0021
2.33 -1.72 1.09 -3.14 1.13 -0.29
dum_bel 0.1631 0.0963 0.1342 --- -0.0426 dum_bel 0.0325 0.0213
9.76 6.41 6.46 -2.17 2.70 2.06
dum_ire --- -0.0353 --- --- -0.0753 dum_ire --- 0.0089
-0.63 -2.01 0.24
dum_lux --- -0.2111 --- --- -0.1156 dum_lux --- -0.0822
-4.77 -2.92 -2.79
dum_den --- -0.1249 --- --- -0.1457 dum_den --- -0.0316
-2.80 -4.34 -1.07
dum_ukd --- --- 0.0001 --- 0.0069 dum_ukd --- ---
0.01 0.59
no. obs. 410 410 431 431 238 238 259 259 no. obs. 410 410 431 431
SSR 4.311 3.473 3.558 2.937 1.380 1.144 1.258 1.096 Log Likeli 569.88 573.73 630.63 638.50
Prob F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Prob Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: GDP and UEWP have been instrumented by their first lag. T-values are given in the IV-estimates, z-values for the dynamic model.
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Table A12: Logistic transformation and impact of capital market integration
NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 1
logit terms estimation capital market integration
gccf gccf gccfeu gccfeu gccf gccf gccfeu gccfeu
1985-94 1985-94 1985-94 1985-94 1985-94 1985-94 1985-94 1985-94
constant -1.2124 -2.2014 -0.7781 -0.9509 constant 0.2501 0.0689 0.3254 0.2809
-6.61 -8.46 -4.94 -5.40 5.81 1.51 8.71 6.95
gdp -0.0047 -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0021 gdp -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0005
-7.45 -5.38 -7.25 -3.84 -7.21 -6.07 -7.28 -3.76
zentrreg 0.8406 1.0113 0.9874 0.6541 zentrreg 0.1785 0.1967 0.2328 0.1552
6.2 7.5 8.24 6.71 5.83 8.23 8.44 6.81
uewp 0.0259 0.0436 0.0307 0.0277 uewp 0.0053 0.0084 0.0073 0.0066
5.35 6.21 7.22 5.50 4.86 6.74 7.50 5.62
poden 0.0085 0.0914 -0.0511 0.1461 poden 0.0036 0.0273 -0.0132 0.0323
0.26 2.52 -1.75 5.56 0.48 4.24 -1.96 5.26
area -0.0183 -0.0006 -0.0082 0.0010 area -0.0040 -0.0002 -0.0021 0.0002
-7.12 -0.53 -3.62 1.22 -6.88 -0.90 -3.94 1.04
quinn_openn 0.0333 0.0538 0.0282 0.0282 quinn_ca 0.0192 0.0281 0.0200 0.0207
2.52 2.72 2.50 2.12 1.75 2.34 2.11 1.96
centr 0.5243 0.6332 0.5121 0.1440 centr 0.1179 0.1352 0.1238 0.0359
5.74 5.05 6.35 1.59 5.72 6.08 6.65 1.69
dum_fra 0.1240 0.0558 -0.0887 -0.2172 dum_fra 0.0291 0.0137 -0.0185 -0.0480
2.42 0.66 -1.96 -3.58 2.43 0.89 -1.72 -3.30
dum_bel 0.7056 0.6396 0.3992 -0.1964 dum_bel 0.1602 0.1274 0.0909 -0.0437
10.29 5.91 6.58 -2.51 10.35 6.64 6.51 -2.39
dum_ukd --- -0.0846 --- -0.0040 dum_ukd --- -0.0092 --- -0.0071
-1.33 -0.09 -0.80 -0.64
dum_ire --- --- -0.2406 -0.4164 dum_ire --- --- -0.0455 -0.0925
-1.07 -2.80 -0.88 -2.67
dum_lux --- --- -0.8493 -0.4059 dum_lux --- --- -0.1978 -0.0928
-4.78 -2.62 -4.83 -2.56
dum_den --- --- -0.5318 -0.6208 dum_den --- --- -0.1237 -0.1480
-2.96 -4.66 -2.99 -4.75
no. Obs. 463 268 487 292 no. Obs. 463 268 487 292
SSR 76.6130 40.8501 62.9743 23.3122 SSR 3.9071 1.2849 3.3471 1.2752
Log Likeli -240.5090 -128.2112 -192.9348 -45.2744 Log Likeli 448.4260 335.3289 521.6510 378.9790
Prob Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Prob F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AIC 1.082 1.039 0.846 0.406 AIC -1.894 -2.420 -2.089 -2.500
Note: See Table 1a.
